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RECENT DECISIONS
he takes the chance of any reasonable or legitimate inference being
drawn by the jury which the evidence warrants.0 At common law no
game was in itself unlawful,7 but any practice which tends to injure
public morals is a common law offense.8  Many general practices or
courses of behavior indulged in by certain persons are prejudicial to
the public welfare and are likely to corrupt public morals.9 With this
in mind and in view of the other subdivisions under Section 899 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, it seems that the legislative intent
was to suppress excessive gaming.10 The interpretation of the statute
by the Court of Appeals seems to indicate that mere possession oof
outside wealth would exempt the defendant from the statutory pen-
alty. Thus, it might happen that the successful gambler would be
condoned, and the unsuccessful one condemned." It has been held
that the "visible means" of support, so dwelled on by the Court of
Appeals as a means of freeing the defendant, must be lawfully acquired
and be the result of honest toil.' 2 Here the defendant's "business
and profession" is acknowledgedly gaming. It was the opinion of
the trial judge, in the instant case, that the words "by which to main-
tain themselves" as employed in the statute seem to have nothing to
do with financial return but to the pursuit of busihess. Emphasis is
to be placed on gaming as a vocation, not as an avocation."3
A. M.
CRIMINAL LAW-LARCENY-ABILITY OF WIFE TO COMPLAIN
oF LARCENY BY HUSBAND.-The complaining witness, defendant's
wife, gave to the defendant a check payable to her order to be depos-
ited for collection and the proceeds thereof to be paid over to her.
Subsequently, the complaining witness demanded her money. The
defendant told her that he had spent the money for his own purposes,
and gave the complaining witness a note, which was renewed three
times. None of the notes ,or any part thereof has been paid. The
defendant was charged with violation of Section 1290 of the Penal
6 Graves v. United States, 150 U. S. 118, 14 Sup. Ct. 40 (1893) ; Donegan
v. United States, 296 Fed. 843 (C. C. A. 5th, 1924) ; Blanda v. People, 67 Colo.
541, 189 Pac. 249 (1920) ; People ex rel. Woronoff v. Mallon, 222 N. Y. 456,
119 N. E. 102 (1918); People v. Trombino, 262 N. Y. 689, 188 N. E. 127(1933) ; People v. Smith, 114 App. Div. 513, 100 N. Y. Supp. 259 (1st Dept.
1906).
7 Thomson v. Hayes, 59 Misc. 425, 111 N. Y. Supp. 495 (1908) ; Sherbon
v. Colebach, 2 Vent. 175, 86 Eng. Rep. 377 (K. B. 1726).
8 King v. Rogier, 1 B. & C. 272 107 Eng. Rep. 102 (K. B. 1823).
9 Bx parte McCue, 7 Cal. App. 65, 96 Pac. 110 (1908) ; Morgan v. Nolte,
37 Ohio St. 23 (1881).
1o People v. Erickson, 171 Misc. 937, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 997 (1939).
21 (1939) 14 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 173.
12 People v. Cramer, 139 Misc. 545, 247 N. Y. Supp. 821 (1930).
13 Watts v. Malatesta, 262 N. Y. 80, 186 N. E. 210 (1933).
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Law. The defendant moved to dismiss the charges on the ground
that as the husband of the complaining witness, he cannot, as a matter
of law, be guilty of the crime of larceny or embezzlement of her funds.
Held, a husband may be guilty of larceny of his wife's property.
People on complaint of Rossiter v. Rossiter, 173 Misc. 268, 17 N. Y.
S. (2d) 30 (1940).
By marriage at common law husband and wife became one per-
son,1 and the husband was that person.2  All personal property be-
longing to the wife while she was a feme sole vested absolutely in the
husband at the moment of marriage,3 and he had the right to posses-
sion of all that she had acquired during her coverture. 4 Marriage
operated as a gift to the husband of all the personal property belonging
to the wife at the time of the marriage.5 The new capacity given to a
woman by the Enabling Acts is to allow her to hold any property
acquired by her as her own, free from interference by her husband in
her use of it.6 She may carry on a separate business, own and dis-
pose of property, contract with her husband as if unmarried, 7 and sue
or be sued in tort.8  The married woman, in the capacity of a property
owner, is treated as if she were a fente sole.9 The result, in so far as
property rights are concerned, is that the unity theretofore existing
between husband and wife has been severed.' 0 Under existing stat-
utes the fiction of unity by virtue of marriage may not be invoked to
deny the married woman a remedy against her husband for his per-
sonal torts." A married woman may appear as a witness against her
husband in criminal actions.' 2 If she steals the property of her hus-
band, she may be convicted of stealing the "property of another" as
stated in the larceny statutes; 13 and, if a husband steal property
belonging to his wife, he should be found guilty of larceny.14 Al-
though at common law neither husband nor wife could commit larceny
from the other.,15 and although the common law theory of marital
I Kelso v. Tabor, 52 Barb. 125 (N. Y. 1867).
2 Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917).
3 Jaycox v. Caldwell, 37 How. Pr. 240 (1868), aff'd, 51 N. Y. 395 (1873).
4 Stokes v. Macken, 62 Barb. 145 (N. Y. 1861).
5 Blanchard v. Blood, 2 Barb. 352 (N. Y. 1848).
6N. Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 50.
7Id. §§ 51, 56.
8Id. §57.
9 Cashman v. Henry, 75 N. Y. 103 (1878).
10 Beasley v. State, 138 Ind. 552, 38 N. E. 35 (1894) ; cf. Power v. Lester,
17 How. Pr. 413 (1858), aff'd, 23 N. Y. 527 (1861).
11 Mr. Justice Pound, dissenting in Allen v. Allen, 246 N. Y. 571, 159 N. E.
656 (1927).
12 CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 392; see People v. Dekker, 143 App. Div. 590,
127 N. Y. Supp. 1059 (2d Dept. 1911).
13 State v. Koontz, 124 Kan. 216, 257 Pac. 994 (1927).
14 Hunt v. State, 72 Ark. 241, 79 S. W. 769 (1904) ; Beasley v. State, 138
Ind. 552, 38 N. E. 35 (1894).
15Rex v. Willis, 1 Mood. 375, 168 Eng. Rep. 1309 (1833); see Queen v.
Kenny, 2 Q. B. Div. 307 (1877).
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unity was adhered to even after the passage of the Enabling Acts,16
the theory has suffered many inroads. For all legal purposes the
husband and wife should no longer be considered as one person.17
S.L.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS - DIVORCE - ALIMONY PROVISIONS -
AMENDMENT THEREOF.-Plaintiff appeals from a modification of a
judgment of divorce which reduced the alimony provision of such
judgment from $21,000 per annum to $14,000 per annum. While
living apart plaintiff and defendant entered into a voluntary separation
agreement on December 15, 1929. Several weeks later plaintiff ob-
tained a divorce frorm defendant and the judgment, entered January
24, 1929, incorporated the stipulations of the separation agreement
including the annual payment of $21,000 by the defendant for the
support of the plaintiff and two children. The evidence proved that
the defendant's income was much greater in 1929 than in 1938, and in
1929 the anticipation of his future income was based on foundations
apparently secure. The plaintiff contends that the provisions for the
support of wife and issue incorporated in a decree of divorce pursuant
to a valid separation agreement of the parties may not be changed or
modified without the consent of both parties thereto.1 Held, the
statutory power 2 of the court to modify its decrees is not affected by
the fact that the decree adopted an agreement of the parties, though it
is true that the contractual obligation could not be so modified without
the consent of both interested parties. Goldman v. Goldnun, 282
N. Y. 296, 26 N. E. (2d) 265 (1940).
New York courts unequivocally follow the majority opinions in
the United States to the effect that they have power to modify a judg-
ment of divorce, though such be an adoption of an agreement of the
parties.4 In the instant case the Court of Appeals has clarified any
doubt which may have arisen through the decision laid down in the
16 People ex rel. Troare v. McClelland, 146 Misc. 545, 263 N. Y. Supp. 403
(1933).
17 Mattison v. N. Y. Cent. L RL, 23 N. Y. 529 (1862).
1 Galusha v. Galusha, 138 N. Y. 272, 33 N. E. 1062 (1893).
2 N. Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT §§ 1155, 1170.
3 Herrick v. Herrick, 319 Ill. 146, 149 N. E. 820 (1925); Langrall v.
Langrall, 145 Md. 340, 125 Atl. 695 (1924) ; Wilson v. Caswell, 272 Mass. 297,
172 N. E. 251 (1930) ; Fox v. Fox, 263 N. Y. 68, 188 N.E. 160 (1933) ; Levy
v. Levy, 149 App. Div. $61, 133 N. Y. Supp. 1084 (1st Dept. 1912); Blake v.
Blake, 15 Wis. 339, 43 N. W. 144 (1889). Contra: Connolly v. Connolly, 16
Ohio App. 92 (1922) ; Henderson v. Henderson, 37 Ore. 141, 60 Pac. 597 (1900).
4 Kunker v. Kunker, 230 App. Div. 641, 246 N. Y. Supp. 118 (3d Dept.
1930) (A modification of an alimony provision of a decree of divorce based on
a voluntary separation agreement was granted on proof by petitioner that justice
so required).
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